Free choice *any* in imperatives
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1. Puzzle: Free choice *any* is licensed in imperatives and under existential modals, but not usually under universal modals, as shown in (1).

1. a. Pick any flower!   2 a. □ [you pick $a_{\{x,y\}}$ flower]
   b. You may pick any flower.   b. ◊ [you pick flower x] & ◊ [you pick flower y]
   c. *You must pick any flower.   (*notation:* $a_{\{x,y\}} = \exists z \in \{x,y\}$)

Imperatives have both strong (e.g., command; □) and weak (e.g., acquiescence; ◊) readings. On a weak reading, (1a) has a meaning roughly equivalent to (1b), i.e. (2b). On a strong reading, (1a) means something like the conjunction of (2a) and (2b) (see e.g. Aloni 2007, Kaufmann 2012; *pace* Haspelmath 1997, Dayal 1998). The goal of this talk is to explain i) why free choice *any* is licensed in strong imperatives but not under strong modals, and ii) how the attested reading of free choice *any* in strong imperatives in (2a-b) comes about.

2. Proposal: In a nutshell, I argue that *any* is licensed in strong readings of (1a) because this imperative contains the same structure as the weak modal sentence in (1b). My proposal combines the following three independently motivated ingredients:

i) *Any* is only licensed when it makes a stronger contribution than a plain indefinite (Kadmon & Landman 1993). Following Crnič (2017), I implement this by having a covert *even* associate with the domain of the existential quantifier and induce subdomain alternatives.

ii) Free choice effects are derived by exhaustification (Fox 2007). Following Bar-Lev & Fox (2017), I implement this by having a modified version of Fox (2007)'s *exh* operator associate with the domain of the quantifier as in (3a) and induce subdomain alternatives as in (3b).

3. a. LF of (1b): $even_{C2}$ [exh_{C1} [◊ [you pick $a_{\{x,y\}F1,F2}$ flower]]
   b. C_1 = {◊ [you pick $a_{\{x,y\}}$ flower], ◊ [you pick $a_{\{x\}}$ flower], ◊ [you pick $a_{\{y\}}$ flower]}
   c. C_2 = {exh_{C1} [◊ [you pick $a_{\{x,y\}F1}$ flower], exh_{C1} [◊ [you pick $a_{\{x\}F1}$ flower],
         exh_{C1} [◊ [you pick $a_{\{y\}F1}$ flower]}

Bar-Lev & Fox's (2017) *exh* asserts all of the alternatives in C_1; this is equivalent to asserting that the addressee is allowed to pick flower x and allowed to pick flower y (cf. 2b). As Crnič (2017) notes, the strengthening requirement introduced by *even* is satisfied because the prejacent of *even* entails all of the alternatives in C_2, but this would not be so if the modal was universal (cf. 1c).

iii) Imperatives contain an existential modal that is strengthened by exhaustification to yield strong readings (Schwager 2005, Oikonomou 2016). I implement this with a second *exh*, which associates with the domain of this existential modal and induced subdomain alternatives in a manner exactly parallel to free choice strengthening (cf. Bassi & Bar-Lev 2016 on conditionals).

     I propose that the *exh* that derives free choice for *any*, and the *even* that ensures that *any* is licensed, are located below the *exh* that derives the strong reading of the imperative, as in (4a).

4. a. LF for (1a): exh_{C3} [$even_{C2}$ [exh_{C1} [◊$_{\{w1,w2\}F3}$ [you pick $a_{\{x,y\}F1,F2}$ flower]]]]
   b. C_3 = {$even_{C2}$ [exh_{C1} [◊$_{\{w1,w2\}}$ [you pick $a_{\{x,y\}F1,F2}$ flower]]], $even_{C2}$ [exh_{C1} [◊$_{\{w1\}}$ [you pick $a_{\{x,y\}F1,F2}$ flower]]], $even_{C2}$ [exh_{C1} [◊$_{\{w2\}}$ [you pick $a_{\{x,y\}F1,F2}$ flower]]]}

The higher *exh* asserts all of the alternatives in C_3; this amounts to asserting that each world in the modal's domain is a world where the addressee picks a flower (cf. 2a). Crucially, the <u>prejacent</u> of the higher *exh* is identical to the structure in (3); it is therefore unsurprising that *any* is licensed. The difference between strong imperatives and strong modal statements is that, at the point where the licensing conditions of *any* are checked, only the former are structurally equivalent to weak modal statements. The strengthening of the existential imperative operator happens too late for the licensing of free choice *any* to be sensitive to the distinction between strong and weak imperatives.

References

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