IN DEFENSE OF THE TRUNCATION ACCOUNT FOR MAIN CLAUSE PHENOMENA

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In arguing in favor of an operator movement intervention account for restrictions on main clause phenomena in central adverbial clauses, Haegeman (2012a: 189-193) provides a series of arguments against her previous (2006a,b) truncation analysis for the same set of facts. Haegeman (2012: 261) claims that the problems she raises for her truncation account for central adverbial clauses also apply to truncation accounts for factive that-clauses (de Cuba 2007, de Cuba & Ürögdi 2009 and Basse 2008). In this paper, I argue that Haegeman’s stated problems for truncation analyses in general are specific to her (2006a,b) account and do not necessarily rule out other truncation accounts for factive that-clauses. I will not give a definitive choice between operator movement and truncation here, but rather simply argue that Haegeman’s arguments do not rule out truncation as a competitor to operator movement.

1. Introduction

Haegeman (2006a,b) shows that main clause phenomena (MCP) like argument fronting are not available in central adverbial clauses (CACs) but that they are available in peripheral adverbial clauses (PACs), as illustrated in (1).

(1) a. *While this paper I was revising last week, I thought of another analysis. (Haegeman 2012a:155)

   b. His face not many admired, while his character still fewer felt they could praise. (Haegeman 2012a: 159, citing Quirk et al. 1985: 1378)

In order to account for these facts, Haegeman (2006a,b) proposes that the CP layer of CACs is structurally deficient while the CP layer in PACs is fully articulated. Since the position for topicalization is truncated in CACs, argument fronting is blocked. Haegeman (2006b) extends the truncation analysis to finite that-clauses, claiming that the CP layer of factive complements is also truncated, providing an explanation for why factive complements resist MCP (2) and non-factive complements do not (3). Her structures for English are provided in (4).

*Thanks to the participants at CLA 2014 for helpful questions and comments.

1 Note that Haegeman (2006a) includes a low TopP between the lowest Mod and Fin for Romance languages which is proposed to account for clitic left dislocation (CLLD), which is allowed in truncated clauses. Since English does not allow argument fronting in truncated clauses (4c), this position is argued not to appear in English.
(2)  a. *John regrets that this book Mary read.
    (Haegeman 2012: 257, citing Maki et al. 1999: 3))
   
   b. *Mary realizes that this book, John read.
    (Haegeman 2012: 257 citing Hegarty 1992: 52, note 19)

(3)  a. John believes that this book Mary read.
    
    b. Mary claims that this book, John read.

(4)  a. Root Clauses:   Mod Top Foc Top Force Mod  Fin
    b. Non-factives/PACs:   Sub Mod Top Foc Top Force Mod  Fin
    c. Factives/CACs:   Sub   Mod  Fin

Since root clauses (4a) and non-factives and PACs (4b) have the full complement of left-peripheral positions, argument fronting is allowed.

In recent work however, Haegeman (2012a,b) has abandoned her truncation hypothesis in favor of an operator movement account. Haegeman (2012a), following Haegeman & Ürögdi (2010), instead proposes that MCP are blocked in CACs and that-clauses due to intervention effects caused by operator movement from a TP-internal position to a CP position. In (5) we see the implementation for factive that-clauses where movement of an event operator from a position tentatively labeled F(unctional)P to a CP position is argued to block argument fronting.

(5)  [CP OPi C… [FP ti [TP… ]]] (Haegeman & Ürögdi 2010:115)

Since root clauses, non-factives and PACs are argued not to have the operator movement proposed in (5), argument fronting to the left periphery is licit in these constructions.

In a related truncation analysis for MCP in that-clauses, de Cuba & Ürögdi (2009) propose that referential complement clauses are truncated while non-referential clauses are fully articulated, as shown in (6).

(6)  a. [CP]   (referential CP)
    b. [cP [CP]]   (non-referential cP)

For de Cuba & Ürögdi, the lack of cP in (6a) correlates with the unavailability of argument fronting in referential that-clauses while the presence of cP in (6b) facilitates argument fronting. However, their analysis less spelled out that Haegeman’s (2006a,b) in regards to the exact position for argument fronting, a point I will return to below.

Haegeman’s (2012: 189-193) arguments against truncation are primarily aimed against her (2006a,b) truncation proposal in (4) and they concentrate mainly on the analysis of CACs and PACs. Later in her book Haegeman (2012: 261) claims that that the truncation analysis proposed by de Cuba & Ürögdi (2009) (D&Ü henceforth) in (6)

\(^{2}\) Note that de Cuba & Ürögdi (2009) replace the concept ‘factivity’ with ‘referentiality’. See section 2.2. for more discussion.
for finite that-clauses suffers from the same problems as her (2006a,b) account. However, I will argue here that many of the arguments she presents are specific to the details of her own truncation account and don’t carry over to other accounts. In addition, I will argue that some of the arguments she presents can equally be made against the operator movement account, leaving neither account with a clear advantage over the other.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the three competing analyses in more detail. In section 3, I summarize Haegeman’s (2012a) arguments against truncation and provide responses. In section 4, I provide a speculative proposal that updates the truncation account. Section 5 concludes the discussion.

2. The competing accounts

In this section I present the three competing proposals for accounting for the lack of argument fronting in factive that-clauses.

2.1. Truncation analysis 1: Haegeman 2006a,b

Haegeman (2006a,b) proposes the following cartographic structures, repeated here in (7), for root clauses, CACs, PACs and embedded factive and non-factive that-clauses. For CACs and factive that-clauses a number of projections are truncated, as shown in (7c).

(7) a. Root Clauses: Mod Top Foc Top Force Mod Fin
    b. Non-factives/PACs: Sub Mod Top Foc Top Force Mod Fin
    c. Factives/CACs: Sub Mod Fin

In Haegeman’s (2006a,b) analysis, Force is a dedicated head for anchoring to the speaker (speaker deixis). In addition, Force licenses the Mod, Foc and Top projections above it. Since these projections are truncated in (7c), there is no position available for argument fronting in factive that-clauses or CACs.

Although she takes a cartographic view, Haegeman’s truncation account assumes a left periphery that deviates substantially from the more standard Rizzian (1997 et seq.) implementation in (8a).

(8) a. Rizzi (2004): Force Top Int Top Foc Mod Top Fin
    b. Haegeman (2006b): Sub Mod Top Foc Top Force Mod Fin

There are two innovations in (8b) that I will focus on here. The first innovation is that Sub (Subordinator) is the highest projection in both adverbial clauses and that-clauses. The motivation for having the Sub position above and separate from Force is that the same subordinating conjunction can select either a CAC or a PAC. Haegeman (2006b) appeals to Bhatt & Yoon (1992), who differentiate a pure subordinator position from a

3 Note that Haegeman replaces ‘Force’ in (7a,b) with ‘speaker deixis’ (SD) in the (2006b) paper, but uses ‘Force’ again in her (2012a) summary of her earlier truncation account. I use ‘Force’ here for ease of exposition.
position encoding illocutionary force. For adverbial clauses, this position hosts the subordinating conjunction, which can then select a PAC with Force or a CAC without Force. Haegeman then extends the Sub analysis to embedded that-clauses, treating that as a subordinating conjunction.

One problem with invoking the work of Bhatt & Yoon (see also Szabolcsi 1994) is that they specifically analyze English as a language that conflates subordinators and force in one position, as opposed to say Yiddish, Korean or Hungarian. If this is correct, then an analysis like (7), which crucially depends on the independence of Sub and Force, does not seem to fit with English that-clauses.

Another problem is that that does not seem to pattern syntactically with other so-called subordinating conjunctions (before, when, because, etc.) in the external syntax (9), or in extraction (10). If that and subordinating conjunctions were of the same category we might expect similar syntactic behavior.

(9) a. I closed the door before/when/because/*that John was yelling at Mary.
   b. I said *before/*when/*because/that John was yelling at Mary.

(10) a. *Who did you close the door before/when/because John was yelling at?
   b. Who did you say that John was yelling at?

Along these lines, Huddleston & Pullum (2002, 2006) classify complementizers like that and whether as ‘subordinators’, and state that, “[s]ubordinators are traditionally analyzed as ‘subordinating conjunctions,’ but that traditional category also embraces numerous words such as after, although, because, before, conditional if, unless, until, etc., which are syntactically and semantically very different from subordinators.” (Huddleston & Pullum 2006:213).4 They argue that these words which are found in adverbial clauses are better analyzed as prepositions. Abstracting away from what the correct categorization of these words in adverbial clauses should be, it is clear that they do not behave syntactically or semantically like complementizers. It therefore does not seem likely that they would share the same syntactic position as complementizers.

The second innovation to note in (8b) is that Force is below a number of projections. The motivation for Haegeman to propose that Top and Foc are higher than Force is that these projections seem to be dependent on Force: neither factive clauses nor CACs allow argument fronting, and neither of them seem to have illocutionary force. Thus, it would make sense that if sentences without Force are the ones that are truncated, then Top and Foc should be above Force. However, as discussed above, since it is not clear that the complementizer that is a subordinating conjunction separate from Force, the motivation for Top and Foc positions above Force is also questionable, at least in that-clauses.

To summarize, the specific truncation analysis Hageman (2012a) is arguing against (Haegeman 2006a,b) is quite different from a standard Rizzian left periphery and also

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4 Thanks to Brandon Fry for bringing this reference to my attention.
differs from the syntax proposed in other truncation accounts. Thus, the arguments against it may not hold against different types of truncation accounts. Additionally, in this section I’ve presented some additional potential problems for the modified cartographic structures in (7) proposed by Haegeman (2006a,b). In the next section I look at the truncation analysis proposed in D&Ü in a bit more detail.

2.2. Truncation account 2: de Cuba & Ürögdi 2009

As discussed in section 1, D&Ü propose that there are two types of finite that-clauses with different sized structures, repeated here in (11).

(11) a. [CP] (referential CP)
    b. [cP [CP]] (non-referential cP)

For D&Ü, the choice between these structures does not correspond one-to-one to the semantic class (factivity) of the selecting verb or the assertive status of the complement clause. The distinction between more complex and less complex embedded clauses comes down to the referentiality of the clause; a property whose syntactic relevance is well established in other domains. D&Ü’s characterization of the differences between referential and non-referential clauses in provided in (12).

(12) Characterization of referential & non-referential clauses (from de Cuba & Ürogdi 2010: 45):

a. [CP]: a referential entity that denotes a proposition without illocutionary force. Since referentiality does not implicate truth-conditional presupposition, both factive and non-factive predicates are compatible with this clause type. On this definition, a CP is simply used to refer to a proposition, hence (just as in the case of referring expressions in general) contextual givenness is also not a necessary requirement.

b. [cP [CP]]: a non-referential semantic object denoting a speech act, i.e. an unresolved proposition or an open question. Since speech acts cannot be presupposed (fully presupposed propositions are not felicitous as speech acts, given that speech acts must add something to the context) true factives are not compatible with this type of complement.

Haegeman (2006a,b) is much more explicit than D&Ü in spelling out the syntactic position for argument fronting. D&Ü do not present a cartographic analysis, and the exact position for argument fronting is not clearly spelled out, only tied to the extra cP structure. At any rate, since the details in D&Ü are not as clear as needed, I will provide more discussion below and speculate on what the syntax might look like in section 4.

To summarize, the D&Ü truncation analysis differs from Haegeman (2006a,b) in a number of ways. First, it relies on the concept of referentiality as opposed to factivity or
assertion. Second, the head associated with illocutionary force ($c^0$) heads the highest projection in the left periphery (not Sub). Finally, there are only two dedicated heads in the CP-field, $C^0$ and $c^0$, making this left periphery decidedly less cartographic, and raising questions about where the position for argument fronting is (as well as other left peripheral material). The question is whether D&Ü holds up better than Haegeman (2006a,b) against the arguments against truncation from Haegeman (2012a).

2.3. Operator movement and intervention: Haegeman 2012a

As mentioned in section 1, Haegeman (2012a), following Haegeman & Ürögdi (2010), proposes that MCP are blocked in CACs and factive that-clauses by intervention effects caused by operator movement from a TP-internal position to a CP position, as repeated here in (13).

(13) $[CP \text{OP: } C \ldots [FP \text{ti: } [TP \ldots ]]]$ (Haegeman & Ürögdi 2010:115)

PACs and non-factive that-clauses are argued not to have the relevant operator movement, so no intervention effects take place and argument fronting is allowed. Different operators are proposed for temporal adverbial clauses (temporal OP), conditional clauses (world OP) and factive that-clauses (event OP), but all of these constructions are argued to follow a similar relativization strategy (creating free relative constructions) which results in intervention effects that block argument fronting. On the other hand, clauses that do allow argument fronting are argued to have either have no operator, no operator movement or operator movement from a position higher that the landing site of argument fronting. In any of these cases, no intervention effects would result (Haegeman 2012a: 215-217).

3. Haegeman 2012a: Arguments against truncation

In this section I examine the problems for truncation for laid out by Haegeman (2012a), and also compare the D&Ü truncation analysis with the operator movement analysis when relevant. In each section I briefly present the argument against truncation followed by discussion. I will also discuss relevant work from Bianchi & Frascarelli (2010), who discuss positions for three different kinds of topics, A(boutness)-topics, C(ontrastive)-topics and G(iven)-topics. This discussion will also be relevant to section 4.

3.1. The account is stipulative

Haegeman first argues that the truncation account stipulates that the availability of argument fronting is tied to the presence of Force. She also states that the makeup of the left-periphery in (7b, 8b) is defined in such a way to disallow argument fronting but disallow allow leftPeripheral adjuncts and Romance clitic left dislocation (CLLD).
For space reasons, I will leave aside the non-trivial question of the position left-peripheral adjuncts and CLLD in clauses that disallow argument fronting.\(^5\) As for tying argument fronting to Force, much like Haegeman (2006a,b), one could argue that D&Ü also stipulate that argument fronting in English depends on the presence of a projection associated with illocutionary force, namely \(cP\). There is perhaps some wiggle room here though for D&Ü, as the definition they provide for \(cP\) in (12b) makes no reference specifically to assertive force; but as it stands this seems like a fair complaint. In contrast, in the operator movement account all clauses that block MCP are argued to be hidden free relatives, so argument fronting is not tied to Force.

However, comparing the two accounts, one could lodge a similar ‘stipulation’ complaint against the operator movement account. Argument fronting in English is argued to be dependent on the absence of operator movement to the left periphery, but one could argue that existence of the event operator and the movement properties of the proposed operator that blocks argument fronting are also stipulated. Neither the existence of the operator nor the operator’s proposed movement are accompanied by strong empirical evidence. In the realm of factive that-clauses, the main empirical evidence provided in favor of operator movement comes from Gungbe factive clauses (see Aboh 2005, Haegeman & Ürogdi 2010: 122-125, Haegeman 2012a: 268-269). Liptak (2010) and Bhatt (2010) both argue that there are other plausible ways to analyze the Gungbe data that would not involve operator movement, leaving this analysis with rather weak support. In addition, Bhatt (2010) raises questions on the semantic import of the event operator and the motivations for event operator movement. In the realm of adverbial clauses, Scheffler (2013) argues that Haegeman’s (2012a) distinction between central and peripheral adverbial clauses risks becoming circular. For example, she notes that the evidence Haegeman presents for certain temporal clauses involving since and while having two distinctive readings (one temporal reading and one concessive or causal) does not carry over straightforwardly to other adverbial clauses those involving because and if.\(^6\) Given these open questions about the operator and its movement in a number of cases, both operator movement and truncation appear to be vulnerable to the ‘stipulation’ complaint, with arguably neither in a position of advantage over the other.

### 3.2. Force in the left periphery

Haegeman’s (2006a,b) account ties the presence of Top and Foc to the presence of Force. This motivates Haegeman to propose that Top and Foc are higher than Force. However, this hierarchy makes it unclear how a predicate selects for a specific illocutionary force since the top layer is Sub, not Force.

This argument is rather specific to Haegeman’s modification of Rizzi’s left periphery. As discussed in section 2.1., Haegeman’s (2006a,b) proposal that the

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\(^5\) In section 4 I propose a less cartographic left periphery than Haegeman (2006a,b) which is potentially more flexible in providing lower positions for adjuncts and CLLD. However, the exact position for left-peripheral adjuncts and CLLD is an important question and I will look to address it in future work.

\(^6\) See also Larson & Sawada (2012), who note that while clauses block root transformations like argument fronting, yet unlike before and after clauses they have no historical link to operator movement.
complementizer *that* in finite *that*-clauses be treated the same as subordinating conjunctions is problematic, as they do not seem to behave the same way syntactically or semantically. For D&Ü, in non-referential *that*-clauses *cP* is the highest projection, as in (14b), and the locus for illocutionary force (speech acts); therefore, selection should not be a problem.

(14) a. Embedded MCP clauses/PACs: Sub Mod Top Foc Top **Force** Mod Fin
b. Embedded Non-referential clause: **cP** CP

As for adverbial clauses (not discussed by D&Ü), Haegeman (2012: 185) notes that “one and the same ‘conjunction’ may introduce both peripheral and central adverbial clauses.” This motivates her to separate Force and Sub in her 2006a and 2006b papers. For D&Ü, *that*-clauses are much the same, in that many predicates can combine with either a referential *CP* or a non-referential *cP*. Since the illocutionary force of an embedded clause in this system is not controlled by the selecting predicate but by the referential status of the embedded clause itself, it is not clear why we need a Sub to mediate this. At any rate, neither the operator movement account nor D&Ü’s truncation account appear to be particularly vulnerable to the argument in this section.

### 3.3. The presence of Force is not sufficient to allow argument fronting

For many speakers, argument fronting is not allowed with root yes/no questions (15a), root *wh*-questions (15b) or imperatives (15c) – all of which presumably have illocutionary force.

(15) a. *Those petunias*, did John plant?
   b. *Those petunias*, when did John plant?

Haegeman argues that if only assertive force licenses argument fronting, then argument fronting is not tied to the position itself, but to specific contents of the position (say, an assertive operator). Thus the motivation for truncation of the position is lost. Indeed, something beyond the existence of the structural position is needed to drive argument fronting, since not all ‘asserted’ clauses have argument fronting, and some clauses with illocutionary force disallow argument fronting. In D&Ü’s system, the *cP* is available in all non-referential clauses, whether there is argument fronting or not. All D&Ü’s truncation account says is that the absence of *cP* blocks argument fronting. Thus, their account is vulnerable to this conceptual argument, as it does need to appeal to both truncation and whatever features drive argument fronting. The operator movement account does not propose truncation, so it is not vulnerable here. However, whether or

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7 Additionally, it is not clear that selection should even be an issue, given that many predicates can select more than one type of clause (TP or CP, CP or DP, ref CP or non-ref *cP*, etc.). See Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 1012-1013) for discussion of mixed selectional properties of a number of heads.
not this conceptual argument matters rests on how well motivated operator movement is. As discussed in section 3.1, while operator movement in some temporal adverbial clauses receives empirical motivation, the motivations for operator movement in other adverbial clauses and factive that-clauses is less clear at the moment.

3.4. Only assertive force licenses topicalization

In an argument related to the discussion in section 3.3, Haegeman (2012a) claims that argument fronting in gerundives like (16) is also problematic for truncation analyses.

(16) **That solution** Robin having already tried to and rejected, she decided to see if she could mate in six moves with just the rook and two pawns.
     (Culicover and Levine 2001: 297, note 14)

She argues that an analysis relying on assertive features would be counterintuitive since it would mean that these gerundive sentences like (14) are assertions despite the fact that these gerunds cannot appear as independent assertions.

While this might seem at first to be a problem for D&Ü’s truncation account, there is a possible analysis to get around these type of examples. Since D&Ü tie extra structure to referentiality, not assertion (see section 2.2.), it may be possible that examples like (16) occur in non-referential contexts, and thus have a full left periphery available for argument fronting. In other words, since cP is not tied directly to assertion, it is possible that a non-asserted clause can still have the extra structure needed for argument fronting.

Haegeman herself actually appeals to a similar explanation for an analogous marginal cases of topicalization in a type of clause that normally does not allow argument fronting. Note that in (16), that solution is what Bianchi & Frascarelli (2010) (B&F henceforth), following Frascarelli & Hinterhölzl (2007), would call a C-topic. They divide topics into three types, as in (17).

(17) a. **A**(boutness-shift)-topic: newly proposes or reintroduces a topic in the discourse [...] It is an instruction on how to update the propositional Common Ground (CG) insofar as it identifies the entity under which the proposition expressed in the clause should be stored in the CG content.

b. **C**(ontrastive)-topic: induces alternatives in the discourse, which have no impact on the Focus value of the sentence and create oppositional pairs with respect to other topics [...] The C-Topic provides an instruction for the hearer on how to relate the asserted proposition(s) to a strategy of inquiry.

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8 Note that Haegeman (2012a) reports topicalization in gerundive clauses to be “marginally acceptable.”

9 Note that the asymmetry between English topicalization and Romance CLLD (CLLD allowed in contexts that topicalization is not) is argued by B&F to only occur with G-topics – English G-topics do not front while Romance G-topics do.
c. **G(iven)-topic**: A constituent that is used to resume background information or for topic continuity [...] Givenness is calculated on the basis of the CG content, marking a contextually entailed element, and it does not affect the conversational dynamics. (Bianchi & Frascarelli 2010)

The example in (16) is an example of a C-topic, similar to an example (18) provided by B&F, where an A-topic is also included. They show that there is the following hierarchy among the topics: A-topic > C-topic > G-topic.

(18) \[A-top \text{My son} \] [C-top \text{beans} he likes, but \text{peas} he hates. \\
(Bianchi & Frascarelli 2010:62)

B&F note that while C-topics do not occur in CACs, they do sometimes appear in ‘non-asserted’ clauses like factive clauses (19a), complements to negative predicates (19b), bridge complements under a matrix negation (19c) and anti-factive volitional complements (19d) (examples include acceptance rates from their native informants).

(19)  a.  I am glad that this unrewarding job, she has finally decided to give _ up. 
(12/15) 
b.  He tried to conceal from his parents that the maths exam he had not passed _, and the biology exam he had not even taken _, (13/15) 
c.  Mary didn’t tell us that Bill she had fired _, and John she had decided to promote _. (8/15) 
d.  I hope that the past he will forget _, and the future he will face _ bravely. 
(13/15)  (Bianchi & Frascarelli 2010: 69)

In regard to the examples in (19), B&F speculate that C-topics do not need illocutionary force: they only need a proposition. In response to the availability of argument fronting in factive (19a), Haegeman (2012a: 189, fn.30) speculates that in this example the predicate receives an “I’m glad to say” interpretation, which allows for argument fronting. Following the general pattern of Haegeman’s intervention analysis, this means that in the examples in (16) and (19) there is no operator movement. Thus, both the operator movement account and D&Ü’s truncation account seem to be in the same boat with examples like these. Both analyses would claim that there is a semantic difference between clauses that allow or don’t allow MCP which triggers this syntactic difference.

3.5. **What is assertion?**

What is assertion? As Haegeman notes, there is no clear definition, which leads to circularity (see also Heycock 2006). In other words, those clauses that allow MCP are said to be asserted, and those that do not allow MCP are said to be non-asserted.

D&Ü do not appeal to assertion – they appeal to referentiality. Of course one could also see referentiality as being a circular concept, even though it is more commonly invoked in the syntactic literature. At any rate, Haegeman & Ürögdi (2010) also appeal to
referentiality in their operator movement account in that-clauses, and thus share the same vulnerability to this kind of argument as D&Ü.

As noted in section 3.1., the semantic contribution of the ‘event operator’ in factive that-clauses is not entirely clear, nor is the motivation for proposed movement of the operator argued to cause intervention effects in Haegeman & Ürögdi (2010). In fact, more questions on the content of the operator can be raised in regards to another set of that-clauses that block argument fronting. In addition to extending her operator movement analysis to factive that-clauses, Haegeman (2012a) speculates that clausal complements of N could have operator movement as well, since they also block argument fronting, as in (20).

(20)  a. *I resent the fact that each part he had to examine carefully.
    (Haegeman 2012: 258, citing Hooper & Thompson 1973: 479)
    b. *A promise that defective sets the company will fix has been made by John.
    (Haegeman 2012: 258, citing Emonds 2004: 77, note 3)
    c. *The claim that on the wall hangs a portrait of Mao is still unsubstantiated.
    (Hooper & Thompson 1973: 486)

Haegeman speculates that complements of N might also be free relatives with operator movement. Haegeman & Ürögdi (2010) cite as predecessors to the event operator movement account both Aboh (2005), who claims that movement of an event operator results in factivity, and Melvold (1986, 1991), who claims that complements of factive predicates are ‘event arguments’ that contain an operator in CP licensed by the functional element definiteness which binds “an open event-position”. Given that the interpretation of clausal complements to N does not appear to be factive or definite in the complement of N examples in (21), yet argument fronting is blocked in the examples in (20), factivity and/or definiteness do not seem to be good candidates for causing the intervention that would block MCP and extraction.

(21)  a. Many people have made the claim that the earth is flat.
    b. Other people believe the story that vampires walk the earth.

Thus, yet another type of semantic operator would be necessary for a subset of that-clauses in order to block the sentences in (20) under the operator movement account.  

3.6. Romance CLLD

Haegeman (2012:192) provides the following grammatical cases of Clitic Left Dislocation in French (22a) and Italian (22b), in contrast to ungrammatical (15b).

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10 See Arsenijević (2009) and Kayne (2008), who treat complement of N structures as relative clauses. For arguments against treating complements of N as relative clauses, see de Cuba (in prep.).
(22) a. **Ton texte, quand l’auras-tu termine**
    Your text, when it have-FUT-2sg-you finish-PART
    ‘Your text, when will it be ready?’

   b. **E la famiglia, dove la lasci?**
    And the family, where it leave-2sg
    ‘And where do you leave your family?’

Haegeman argues that the bolded DPs in (22) must be in a high topic position since they precede the *wh*-words (as opposed to other CLLD topics in Romance, which are arguably in a lower topic position - see Bianchi & Frascarelli’s (2010) G-topics, to be discussed below). This would mean that the truncation analysis would not capture parametric variation between the availability of high topics in Romance (22) and their apparent unavailability in English (15). Haegeman’s (2006a,b) truncation analysis only predicts parametric variation in the availability of low-topics, which available in Romance but not English.

As (22) illustrates, CLLD with A-topics is fine in French. B&F equate CLLD with A-topics to left dislocation (LD) in English. The corresponding LD examples in English in (23) with a pronoun are fine to my ear.

(23) a. **Your text, when will it be ready?**
   b. And **your family**, where do you leave them?

If B&F are correct in equating CLLD with A-topics to LD in English, then there does not seem to be any parametric variation here. Assuming, as B&F do, that A-topics are in the highest topic position, a truncation account could also reasonably account for the lack of A-topics in ‘non-asserted’ clauses.

3.7. Summary

To summarize, in this section I have gone through the arguments against truncation presented in Haegeman (2012a) and found that a number of them are specific to Haegeman (2006a,b) and do not apply to D&Ü. In other cases the arguments she provides against truncation can be equally turned against the operator movement account. As a result, at the present time neither of the two analyses in question seem to have a significant advantage over the other, leaving truncation as a potentially viable option. In the next section I provide a brief sketch of how D&Ü’s truncation account might be extended to cover additional clauses that block MCP.

4. Sketching out an updated truncation account

In this paper I’ve argued that the truncation analysis is still a viable one when discussing restrictions on MCP. However, I have still yet to propose an articulated left periphery comparable to Haegeman (2006a,b). I leave this to future work, but in this section I will
speculate on what it might look like and how truncation can be used to account for the relevant MCP data beyond referential that-clauses. One possibility is to assume D&Ü’s less articulated left periphery, as in (24).

(24) \[
\begin{array}{c}
cP \\
c' \\
c \\
CP \\
C' \\
TP \\
C \\
T \\
T'
\end{array}
\]

As noted in section 3.4., B&F, following Frascarelli & Hinterhölzl (2007), argue for a hierarchy of topic positions corresponding to discourse function, as in (17). One could imagine a system in the left periphery where each of the heads in (24) is associated with different discourse functions and can host different semantic/pragmatic types of material in specifiers or adjoined positions. Focused and topicalized constituents move to, adjoin to, or originate in the left periphery, but which phrase they appear in would be constrained by the features of the head. In contrast to a cartographic approach (Rizzi 2007 et seq.) with dedicated positions in the left periphery, different heads (c, C, T) can each host features attracting topics or foci, as discussed in Miyagawa (2012: 89-90) under his conception of Strong Uniformity. As opposed to assertion, the cP head would be associated with a conversational move in a pragmatic sense, signaling new information (i.e. a non-referential proposition). Given the examples in provided by B&F in (19), the definition for cP in (12b) would have to be amended to allow even true factives (a.k.a. emotive factives) like regret and be glad to select a cP given the right pragmatic conditions, namely when the speaker sees the proposition in the embedded clause as adding something to the common ground in the sense of B&F’s definitions in (17).

As far as the position for different types of left-peripheral topics, if there is nothing added to the common ground, cP is omitted. A-topics could be associated with cP, or perhaps even a higher projection (perhaps a speech act phrase, as discussed in Miyagawa (2012)). C-topics could be associated with cP, or be associated with CP but only available in the presence of cP (in something akin to McCloskey’s (2006) Adjunction Prohibition). G-topics, which can appear freely in ‘non-asserted’ embedded clauses could appear in TP, or some other low position below a truncated cP. Of course, the potential

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11 See also De Cat (2012), who argues that the distribution of MCP can only be fully explained with reference to interpretive properties of the root phenomena interacting with their host clause. These pragmatic properties involve speaker involvement and/or epistemic/information structure properties. This sense of “pragmatic force” can be thought of as being associated with cP in (24).
12 I remain agnostic as to the status of adjuncts in current theory.
13 I leave open the possibility that there may be other left peripheral positions in addition to cP and CP.
14 For arguments against assuming a cartographic view of the left periphery, see the papers in van Craenenbroeck (2009).
analysis sketched out in this section glosses over many non-trivial details, not least of which is the exact positions for topic and focus. I leave to this future work.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I have argued that Haegeman’s (2012a) arguments against truncation accounts are not strong enough to rule out truncation as a competitor to her (2012a,b) operator movement account. A number of her arguments are specific to her (2006a,b) truncation account and don’t apply to the truncation analysis in de Cuba & Úrógdi (2009). In other cases, the arguments against de Cuba & Úrógdi’s version of truncation can arguably be turned against the operator movement account as well.

Haegeman’s operator movement account is impressive in its scope, collecting a series of different constructions that resist main clause constructions under a unified analysis. On the other hand, de Cuba & Úrógdi’s (2009) truncation account is limited to main clause phenomena in that-clauses. In section 4 I briefly attempted to sketch out an extension of the truncation account that could apply to other types of clauses that resist MCP. This extension relies on general discourse principles (adding or not adding to the common ground) as opposed to a series of different types of operators in different constructions. Whether this type of analysis can be successful in covering MCP restrictions in clauses other than that-clauses remains to be seen as the details of the proposed analysis are filled in.

References


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